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ANOTHER LOOK AT THE EUROBAROMETER SURVEYS
WILLIAM H. J. HUBBARD*

1.

Introduction

In 2011 the European Commission published its Proposal for a Regulation of
the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common European Sales
Law (“Proposal”).1 The Proposal is the product of extensive study and the
latest manifestation of the momentum in many quarters toward harmonization
of European contract law. The proposed Common European Sales Law
(CESL) has engendered a spirited debate about its costs and benefits.2 Notable
features of CESL include: its optional character as an opt-in regime of sales
law applicable to cross-border contracts; its applicability only to
business-to-business (B2B) contracts involving small- or medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) and business-to-consumer (B2C) contracts; its reliance on
custom and usage in the B2B context; and its extensive, mandatory consumer
protection provisions in the B2C context. As evidenced by the other papers in
this special issue, abler contracts scholars than myself have offered both
criticism and defence of these features.
Given this heated debate, one is tempted to ask if CESL is worth the
considerable effort and controversy attending it. To this question the Proposal
offers a clear answer. The Proposal opens with these words:
“Differences in contract law between Member States hinder traders and
consumers who want to engage in cross-border trade within the internal
market. The obstacles which stem from these differences dissuade traders,
small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) in particular, from entering cross
border trade or expanding to new Member States’ markets. Consumers are
hindered from accessing products offered by traders in other Member States.”3
In other words, whatever the strengths or weaknesses of its particular
details, CESL or something like it is needed. Current disuniformity in contract
law across Europe is stifling trade, especially by SMEs.
* Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School. I thank Lisa Bernstein
for drawing my attention to the Eurobarometer surveys, and Nicole Cherry, Andrew Spruiell,
and Shuang Tian Yang for valuable research assistance.
1. COM 635(2011)final.
2. The papers presented at “European contract law: A law-and-economics perspective” and
collected in this special issue provide a small sampling of this debate.
3. Proposal, 2.
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This is an empirical claim. More precisely, the Proposal’s language quoted
above contains a bundle of four empirical claims:
Claim 1: There are a significant number of traders in the EU, and in
particular SMEs, who want engage in cross-border trade or increase their
cross-border trade, but do not;
Claim 2: Obstacles created by differences in contract law are an
impediment to cross-border trade, especially for SMEs;
Claim 3: There are a significant number of consumers in the EU who want
to make cross-border purchases, but cannot;
Claim 4: Obstacles created by differences in contract law are an
impediment to cross-border purchases by consumers.
These empirical claims are the central justification for CESL.4 With respect
to SMEs, if the first claim is not true, then there is no problem to solve; and if
the second claim is not true, then CESL will not solve the problem. Likewise,
for consumers, if the third claim is not true, then there is no problem to solve;
and if the fourth claim is not true, then CESL will not solve the problem.
The Proposal does not make these claims without offering evidence to
support them. The European Commission sponsored studies to address
aspects of these claims, and the Proposal expressly cites this empirical data. In
particular, the Proposal cites two surveys, Flash Eurobarometer 320 and 321,
to point out that “traders ranked contract-law-related obstacles among the top
barriers to cross-border trade”.5 (Flash EB 320 surveyed enterprises engaged
in B2B transactions, and Flash 321 surveyed enterprises engaged in B2C
transactions). This suggests that contract law is a major impediment to
cross-border trade, and it raises the possibility that a large number of traders
are dissuaded from cross-border trade.
The Proposal’s companion document, A Common European Sales Law to
Facilitate Cross-Border Transactions in the Single Market (“Companion
Document”),6 cites Flash Eurobarometer 299 as evidence of the small number

4. There are other important justifications as well, such as fostering a common European
legal identity and establishing shared values throughout Europe. See Mak, “In defence of
CESL”, this issue.
5. Proposal, 2. Flash Eurobarometer 320, “European contract law in business-to-business
transactions” (Flash EB 320) was a survey conducted by the Gallup Organization in Jan. 2011
of 6,475 managers at enterprises in the 27 EU Member States. See Summary, Flash EB 320
(2011) and Analytical Report, Flash EB 320 (2011). Flash Eurobarometer 321, “European
contract law in consumer transactions” (Flash EB 321) was a survey conducted by the Gallup
Organization in Jan. 2011 of 6,465 managers at enterprises in the 27 EU Member States. See
Summary, Flash EB 320 (2011) and Analytical Report, Flash EB 320 (2011). All summaries
and analytical reports for the cited Flash EB surveys are available at <ec.europa.eu/
public_opinion/archives/flash_arch_en.htm> (last visited 12 Sept. 2012).
6. COM 636(2011)final.
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of European consumers currently purchasing online from other countries.7
The Companion Document also cites the Third Edition of the Consumer
Markets Scoreboard (“Scoreboard”),8 for the claim that “attempts to purchase
products online more often fail than succeed in a cross-border context”.9 This
suggests that contract law may be a major obstacle to cross-border activity by
consumers as well.
Given that this survey data provides the empirical foundation for the
perceived need that motivates CESL, these studies deserve a closer look. In
this paper, I undertake to do this.10 This paper assesses the degree to which the
Flash EB surveys support the four central empirical claims in the Proposal.
Section 2 focuses on claims about SMEs (claims 1 and 2). Section 3 focuses
on claims about consumers (claims 3 and 4).
What I find is that the Flash EB and other surveys cited by the Proposal
offer an ambiguous picture of the extent to which contract law may create
obstacles to cross-border trade by businesses and consumers. These surveys
do not suggest that there are large numbers of discouraged traders, or that
contract law is in practice a major obstacle to cross-border trade. They are
consistent, however, with the proposition that a small, but economically
significant, number of traders and consumers are discouraged from
cross-border trade by differences in European contract law. To prove this latter
proposition will require further, and more careful, study.
2.

Empirical evidence on cross-border trade, contract law and
SMEs

Claim 1 is that there are a significant number of traders, in particular SMEs,
who want to (but do not) engage in cross-border trade or increase the number
of Member States with which they trade. The Proposal itself provides a brief
7. Companion document, 3. Flash Eurobarometer 299, “Consumer attitudes towards
cross-border trade and consumer protection” (Flash EB 299), was a survey conducted by the
Gallup Organization in September 2010 of 25,139 individuals in the 27 EU Member States. See
Summary, Flash EB 299 (March 2011). Components of this survey were reported as Flash
Eurobarometer 299a, “Attitudes towards cross-border trade and consumer protection” (Flash
EB 299a). See Analytical Report, Flash EB 229a (2011).
8. SEC 385(2010), 9.
9. Companion document, 3.
10. The survey micro-data, or “primary data”, for these surveys is publicly available
through GESIS, <www.gesis.org> (last visited 12 Sept. 2012). All data from the Flash EB 320
and 321 surveys presented in this paper are based on this primary data; there may be slight
discrepancies between the summary statistics generated by this data and those presented in the
corresponding analytical reports or summaries for the surveys. I rely solely on the summaries
and analytical reports for the Flash EB 299 and Flash EB 299a surveys.
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statement of the empirical basis for this fundamental claim: “Currently, only
one in ten [EU] traders, involved in the sale of goods, exports within the Union
and the majority of those who do only export to a small number of Member
States”.11 This statement can be broken down into two separate, component
claims:
(1) “currently, only one in 10 [EU] traders, involved in the sale of goods,
exports within the Union”.12
(2) “the majority of those who do only export to a small number of
Member States”.
These two statements together capture the two crucial aspects in which
barriers to trade, including contract-law-related barriers, may hinder
cross-border trade. The first statement refers to the extensive margin. By
“extensive margin”, I mean the extent to which new businesses may be willing
to enter cross-border trade if barriers to trade are lowered. The second
statement refers to the intensive margin. By “intensive margin”, I mean how
intensively companies already engaged in cross-border trade can participate in
trade with other countries; i.e. businesses already engaged in cross-border
trade may be willing to trade with a greater number of Member States if
barriers to trade fall.
I look at each margin in turn.
2.1.

The extensive margin

The fact that only one in ten EU traders involved in the sale of goods exports
within the EU suggests that there is a lot of room for increasing participation
in cross-border trade. From this, one might conclude that the extensive margin
is very large.
This conclusion, however, would be too hasty. The fact that 90 percent of
traders do not export to other EU Member States does not mean that 90 percent
of traders would export other EU Member States if the barriers to trade were
lower. Some traders may have no interest in exporting and many traders are

11. Proposal, 2.
12. The Proposal provides no citation for this figure, but it may come from Flash
Eurobarometer 196, “Observatory of European SMEs” (Flash EB 196), which was a survey
conducted by the Gallup Organization in Nov.-Dec. 2006 of 16,339 SMEs in the 27 EU Member
States. See Summary, Flash EB 196 (2007).
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involved in the sale of goods for which there is essentially no international
market – i.e. the market for such goods is entirely local. Recall that a
neighbourhood bakery or butcher shop is a “trader involved in the sale of
goods”.
Instead, one should look for evidence on the number of companies who are
not trading cross-border but want to. The Flash EB surveys cited by the
Proposal are helpful here. These surveys asked each respondent whether they
were (1) currently buying or selling cross-border, (2) not currently buying or
selling cross-border, but considering doing so, or (3) not interested in selling
or buying cross-border. The third group was excluded from the sample, so the
sample included only businesses that were interested in cross-border trade.
Thus, the Flash EB 320 and 321 surveys allow us to see how large is the group
of traders who are interested but not engaged in cross-border trade relative to
the group of traders already engaged in cross-border trade.
The results of the two surveys were essentially identical: more than 91
percent of enterprises were currently buying or selling cross-border.13 We can
now reconsider the earlier statistic that only one in 10 traders involved in the
sale of goods exports within the EU. This does not mean that 9 in 10 traders
would export cross-border if the barriers to trade were lower. Instead, the
number is probably much smaller. If 91 percent of the traders who want to
trade are already trading, this implies that the extensive margin is less than 1 in
100 traders.14
A caveat is in order here: this number is a rough cut of the Flash EB data and
is not at all a precise estimate of the extensive margin.15 Rather, the point is
that the Proposal rests on an empirical claim that there is a significant number
of businesses out there, especially SMEs, that want to trade cross-border but
do not because of barriers to trade. The Flash EB surveys cited by the Proposal
indicate that the number of such traders are relatively small.

13. The shares already engaged in cross-border trade was 91.6 % (B2B) and 91.5 % (B2C).
14. If 1 out of 10 traders, or 10 % of traders, are currently exporting, and traders currently
exporting are 91.5 % of traders interested in exporting, then traders interested in exporting
make up 0.10/0.915 = 0.109 = 10.9 % of all traders. Traders interested in exporting but not
already doing so make up 10.9 – 10.0 = 0.9 % of all traders.
15. One limitation of this estimate is that the Flash EB surveys asked traders about buying
or selling cross-border, while the statistic cited by the Proposal referred only to traders
exporting. Thus, these two sets of numbers are not, strictly speaking, comparable. Note, though,
that in the B2C context, cross-border transactions with consumers are by definition exports
only; and the B2C numbers were virtually identical to the B2B numbers.
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Table 1: Number of Enterprises, by Size, Flash EB Surveys
B2B
Micro (1–9)
Small (10–49)
Medium (50–249)
Large (250+)
All Respondents

Number
4,077
1,684
553
161
6,475

B2C

Percent
63.0
26.0
8.5
2.5
100.0

Number
3,678
1,882
695
210
6,465

Percent
56.9
29.1
10.8
3.2
100.0

Note: Parentheses contain number of employees in enterprises of each category.
Source: Flash EB 320 (B2B); Flash EB 321 (B2C).

Why might it make sense that the extensive margin would be small? Many
SMEs, especially small and micro enterprises, are engaged in inherently local
trade. While many SMEs may aspire to trade cross-border, it is likely that
many more do not. And since the vast majority of all enterprises are small and
micro enterprises (see Table 1), one might expect the extensive margin to be
small: the few large companies are already trading cross-border, while a large
fraction of the many small companies are not interested in it. Indeed, a strong
predictor of SME participation in cross-border trade is the size of its home
country (SMEs in small countries trade more),16 which suggest that
geographical, rather than legal, barriers are the primary determinants of
cross-border trade.
Table 2: Percentage of Total Employment, by Enterprise Size,
Flash EB Surveys

Micro (1–9)
Small (10–49)
Medium (50–249)
Large (250+)
All Respondents

B2B

B2C

4.1
9.2
15.1
71.6
100.0

4.2
10.6
17.8
67.4
100.0

Source: Flash EB 320 (B2B); Flash EB 321 (B2C).

The extensive margin looks even smaller when one considers not the number
of companies on the extensive margin, but the share of employment on the
16. Flash EB 196, 5, 16.
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extensive margin. Although small and micro enterprises account for nearly 90
percent of the companies in the sample, they account for only a little more than
10 percent of total employment.17 See Table 2. Because small and micro
enterprises account for a small share of total employment, even a large rise in
their participation in cross-border trade will have a modest effect on the
volume of trade.
2.2.

The intensive margin

The Proposal observes that “the majority of [traders] who do [export] only
export to a small number of Member States”. This claim is validated by the
Flash EB survey results, which indicate that among enterprises that trade
cross-border, approximately 60 percent trade with three other countries or
fewer.18 This suggests that, while the extensive margin may be small, there
may be room on the intensive margin for policies to increase participation in
cross-border trade.
Figure 1: Percentage of Enterprises Engaged in Cross-Border Trade
with 4 or More Member States, by Enterprise Size, B2C

Note: Excludes traders not engaged in cross-border trade.
Source: Flash EB 321.
17. These shares are calculated after removing the two largest employers from each of the
Flash EB 320 and 321 samples. Out of over 6,000 enterprises, the two largest in each survey
accounted for approximately half of all employment. Including these enterprises skews the
numbers even more strongly in favour of large companies. I use the truncated sample in the
remainder of this paper; for the remaining results, truncation has no effect.
18. The shares are 59.9 % (B2B) and 60.5 % (B2C).
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Once again, though, this statistic should be taken with care. A closer look at
the data reveals that intensity of cross-border trade is strongly correlated with
firm size. See Figure 1.19 Only among micro and small enterprises do the
majority of enterprises trade with three or fewer other countries. Even among
small enterprises nearly half of them are already trading with four or more
other countries.
This pattern in the data is consistent with two stories: first, as noted above,
it may simply be that the bulk of micro enterprises are not in a position to trade
more broadly, even if contract-law-related barriers (or any other barriers) are
reduced. If so, the intensive margin is small. Second, it may be that
contract-law-related barriers to trade are greatest for micro enterprises, and
this is why they disproportionately fail to engage in cross-border trade. In this
case, the intensive margin may be large. The Proposal accepts this view, saying
that “dealings with various national laws are burdensome particularly for
SME”,20 and the Companion Document goes on to note that the burden falls
especially on “micro and small enterprises”.21
If this latter account is true, then we should see evidence that micro
enterprises are more concerned than large enterprises about the problems
presented by contract law. If, however, the less intense cross-border trade by
SMEs is because SMEs are less interested in cross-border trade than large
companies, we should expect them to be less concerned than large companies
about contract-law-related barriers to trade.
This brings us to Claim 2: that contract-law-related barriers to trade are an
impediment to trade by SMEs in particular. As I describe below, SMEs are less
concerned about contract-law-related barriers than large enterprises.
Contract-law-related barriers to trade, particularly for SMEs

2.3.

Before comparing the attitudes of SMEs and large enterprises about
contract-law-related barriers, we must first review the evidence on
contract-law-related barriers cited by the Proposal. The Proposal states:
“Surveys [citing Flash EB 320 and 321] show that out of the range of
obstacles to cross-border trade including tax regulations, administrative
requirements, difficulties in delivery, language and culture, traders ranked
contract-law-related obstacles among the top barriers to cross-border
trade”.22

19.
20.
21.
22.

Figure 1 provides B2C data; B2B data yields the same pattern.
Proposal, 3.
COM 636(2011)final, 2.
Proposal, 2.
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This is true. The Flash EB surveys identify four contract-related barriers, each
of which easily falls in the top ten potential barriers to trade listed in the Flash
EB surveys. But given the structure of the Flash EB surveys, this is an
uninteresting result – the top ten potential barriers to trade were the only ten
potential barriers to trade that the Flash EB survey described in its
questionnaire.
Table 3: Percentage of Enterprises Identifying A Potential Barrier as
Having a Large or Some Impact, B2C Survey
Potential Barrier to
Cross-Border Trade
Tax regulations
Learning about foreign contract law
Administrative requirements, e.g., licensing
Compliance with foreign consumer protection
rules
Conflict resolution/cost of litigation abroad
Obtaining legal advice on foreign contract law
Language
After-sales maintenance abroad
Cross-border delivery
Cultural Differences

“Large” or
“Some” Impact
24
23
21
20
19
19
18
16
15
11

Source: Flash EB 321.

Nonetheless, the contract-law-related barriers included in the Flash EB
surveys were rated as about as significant as the other potential barriers, such
as tax regulations and problems with cross-border delivery. Table 3 lists all ten
potential barriers and the percentage of respondents identifying them as
having “a large effect” or “some effect” on the company’s decision to buy or
sell cross-border. The four contract-law-related barriers are placed in italics.23
They are not all at the top, but they are not all at the bottom either. While the
Proposal overstates the import of the Flash EB surveys, the empirical data do
not foreclose the significance of contract law to cross-border trade.

23. The list for the B2B survey is similar, although “Difficulty in agreeing on the foreign
applicable law” replaces “The need to comply with different consumer protection rules in the
foreign contract laws” – and ranks much lower. See Summary, Flash EB 320, 7.
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Table 4: Contract Law in Cross-Border Sales, B2C Survey

Micro (1–9)
Small (10–49)
Medium (50–249)
Large (250+)
All Respondents

Unimportant
Barrier

Small Barrier

Medium or Great
Barrier

47.7
42.1
40.7
38.9
45.0

16.8
18.8
19.1
18.3
17.7

35.5
39.2
40.1
42.8
37.3

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 because of rounding.
Source: Flash EB 321.

But what about SMEs, and small and micro enterprises in particular? How are
they affected by contract law, relative to larger companies? The data from the
Flash EB surveys indicate that SMEs are less concerned about
contract-law-related barriers to trade than large companies. Table 4 reveals
that micro enterprises are less likely to consider contract law to be a “medium”
or “great” barrier to cross-border trade, and more likely to consider it an
“unimportant” barrier, than large enterprises.24 This evidence rejects the view
that the low intensity of cross-border trade by SMEs is the product of
contract-law-related barriers. Indeed, a survey not cited by the Proposal finds
that 46 percent of exporting SMEs did not identify any constraint on their
cross-border trade, and only 8 percent identified a contract-law-related
obstacle (“different regulations in other EU countries”) as their main
constraint.25
In sum, a closer look at the Flash EB data tends to undermine the hypothesis
that there are large extensive and intensive margins along which policies can
increase participation in cross-border trade by SMEs. Further, while contract
law is recognized by many traders as an obstacle to trade, contract-law-related
barriers do not distinguish themselves from a number of other obstacles to
trade considered in the Flash EB surveys.
Nonetheless, small extensive and intensive margins are different from no
margins at all. Even a small increase in intra-EU trade would involve a huge
amount of commerce. Intra-EU export trade easily exceeds ¤2 trillion

24. The B2B survey, Flash EB 320, yields the same pattern.
25. Summary, Flash EB 196, 16.
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(i.e. million million) per year.26 A 0.1 percent increase in trade, for example,
would amount to thousands of millions of Euros.
Thus, reducing the obstacles to trade created by contract law remains a
project worth serious consideration, although we need to be realistic about the
extent of its potential impact. This brings us to the ultimate question about
CESL and cross-border trade by SMEs: Will CESL reduce the barriers to
cross-border trade affecting those SMEs that are “on the margin” of
increasing their cross-border trade?
2.4.

Empirical evidence on CESL and the needs of SMEs

This is hard to answer empirically. As others have noted, one of the weaknesses
of the Flash EB surveys is that they asked questions about contract law in the
abstract, including asking for opinions about the benefits of a hypothetical
European contract law without specifying its contents.27 For this reason,
theoretical analysis of its likely benefits and burdens is important, and many
of the papers in this volume address this need.
It turns out, however, that the Flash EB surveys do provide a few results with
respect to certain major features of CESL. Recall that CESL is an optional
instrument, applicable to cross-border transactions. The Flash EB surveys
specifically asked businesses about their views of the utility of a common
European sales law, depending on whether it is an optional instrument, and
depending on whether it is applicable only to cross-border transactions. The
B2C survey asked, “If a European contract law was developed, what would
you prefer for your business-to-consumer transactions?” and gave three
options. (The B2B survey asked the corresponding question for B2B
transactions). The three choices were:
(1) “A common EU contract law replacing 27 national contract laws”.
(2) “A European contract law that you could choose as an alternative to the
national laws for both your cross-border and domestic transactions”.
(3) “A European contract law that you could choose as an alternative to the
national laws for your cross-border transactions only”.

26. See “Europe in Figures”, (2011) Eurostat Yearbook, ch. 9 “International Trade”
(European Commission 2011) (citing Eurostat (tet00039) <epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/
table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tet00039>).
27. This criticism was raised by Ackermann, “Das Gemeinsame Europäische Kaufrecht –
eine sinnvolle Option für B2B-Geschäfte?”, in Remien, Herrler and Limmer (Eds.),
Gemeinsames Europäisches Kaufrecht für die EU? (C.H. Beck, 2012), pp. 53–54.
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The latter two choices describe an optional instrument, and the third choice
describes an optional instrument for cross-border transactions only, which is
how CESL is structured.28
The surveyed businesses resoundingly reject this third option. In both the
B2B and B2C surveys, only 15.3 percent of the respondents who expressed a
preference selected the third option.29 The overwhelming preference was for
the opposite choice: a single, mandatory European contract law regime that
displaces all 27 national contract laws.30
Even more illuminating are the results when broken down by size of
enterprise. Given the focus of CESL on SMEs, one might hope that among
traders, SMEs are more favourably disposed toward the third option – but the
opposite is true. See Table 5.31
Table 5: Preferences for European Contract Law, B2C Survey,
by Enterprise Size (percent)

Micro (1–9)
Small (10–49)
Medium (50–249)
Large (250+)
All Respondents

Replaces
National
Laws

Optional,
Domestic and
Cross-Border

Optional,
Cross-Border
Only

53.8
53.3
49.3
53.7
53.2

32.4
30.6
31.7
25.4
31.6

13.8
16.2
18.9
20.9
15.3

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 because of rounding. Responses “Don’t know” or “NA”
are excluded.
Source: Flash EB 321.

Why the lack of enthusiasm for the third option? The Flash EB surveys did not
ask businesses to explain their answers, but the patterns in the data we have
seen so far suggest the following explanation: Most small businesses, and
especially micro enterprises, are likely to transact cross-border business, if at
28. For reasons that will become obvious shortly, it is important to note that Art. 13(a) of
CESL provides for individual Member States to extend its coverage to domestic transactions.
Proposal, 28.
29. Not everyone expressed a preference. In the B2B survey, 12.9 % of respondents did not
select one of the choices; in the B2C survey, the non-response rate was 10.7 %.
30. This empirical result seems to confirm the theoretical prediction made by Ganuza and
Gomez, in this issue: “the rule that limits the choice of the CESL solely [to] cross-border
transaction…does not seem a happy one”. Ganuza and Gomez, “Optional law for firms and consumers: An economic analysis of opting into the Common European Sales Law”, section 3.1.
31. Table 5 presents results for the B2C survey; the B2B results are similar.
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all, in one or two other Member States.32 Thus, while the need to account for
multiple contract law regimes may be a source of significant transactions costs
for SMEs, the economies of scale associated with moving to a uniform law for
cross-border transactions are small. For many micro enterprises, the benefit of
a uniform European law for cross-border contracts may be zero, because they
are interested in trading with only one additional Member State – and whether
a business has to learn about CESL or about that Member State’s law, it is one
new legal regime either way.
Similarly, an SME that trades with, say, three other Member States could at
best reduce the number of legal systems governing its contracts by 50 percent,
from four to two (CESL plus its domestic contract law). I say “at best”,
because this assumes that the SME succeeds at making CESL the governing
law in every one of its cross-border contracts. If not, there may be no savings
at all.33
On the other hand, a mandatory instrument that applies to all contracts
domestically and cross-border will benefit an SME interested in trading with
even one other Member State. It reduces by 50 percent the number of legal
systems that SME must learn (from two to one). An SME that trades with three
other Member States would be guaranteed a 75 reduction in legal regimes
(from four to one). Thus, one can see why a mandatory regime would be so
popular among SMEs.
There are obvious political and practical reasons why such a mandatory
regime is infeasible. For this reason, it is worth noting that an optional regime
that applies both domestically and cross-border has the potential, in a
best-case scenario, to generate the same savings.34
These results are summarized in Table 6 for various numbers of trading
partner states and for the three choices of European contract law offered by the
Flash EB survey. Table 6 also helps make sense of the fact that large businesses
seem more tolerant of the possibility of an optional, cross-border instrument.
(Note that the Flash EB surveys did not limit the optional instrument to
transactions involving SMEs, as CESL does). It is the largest companies – the
companies who are most likely to do business in many Member States – who
stand to gain the most from an optional cross-border contract law regime,
given the economies of scale associated with the fixed costs of learning a new
set of legal rules. And the differences in savings between a mandatory
32. See supra section 2.
33. It is possible in the B2B context, given that CESL is optional, that some businesses may
experience a rise in the number of contract law systems with which they must contend, and thus
a rise in costs.
34. Again, by best-case scenario, I refer to a situation in which a business is able to conduct
all of its transactions under the optional law.
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European contract law and an optional one are much smaller for a business
trading with 27 countries than a business trading with one.35
Table 6: Reduction in Number of Legal Regimes Required to Learn, by
Breadth of Cross-Border Trade and Nature of European Contract Law
Number of Other
Member States

Replaces
National
Laws

Optional:
Domestic and
Cross-Border

Optional:
Cross-Border
Only

1
3
10
27

50%
75%
91%
96%

up
up
up
up

0%
up to 50%
up to 83%
up to 93%

to
to
to
to

50%
75%
91%
96%

Note: Maximum number of trading partners is 27 when including Scotland as the 28th legal
regime in the EU.

3.

Contract-law-related barriers for consumers

So far, this paper has focused on the empirical claims related to CESL from the
perspective of businesses, especially SMEs, interested in cross-border trade.
In this section, I turn to the empirical claims motivating CESL’s provisions
governing consumer contracts. I begin by addressing Claim 3, and in
particular the claim that more than half of all online, cross-border purchase
attempts fail.36 I then consider the evidence on whether contract law creates
barriers to cross-border B2C transactions (Claim 4). Finally, I conclude by
considering some empirical data relevant to one of the salient motivations for
CESL’s consumer-related provisions: the need for greater mandatory
consumer protections.
3.1.

Do sellers reject half of all online, cross-border purchase attempts?

The Companion Document states: “In practice, attempts to purchase products
online more often fail than succeed in a cross-border context and often end-up
with a disappointing message such as ‘this product is not available for your
country of residence.’”37 This claim rests on a citation to the Scoreboard,38
35. Hence, it is worth noting that Art. 13(b) of CESL provides for individual Member States
to extend its coverage to B2B transactions not involving SMEs. Proposal, 28.
36. See Companion document, 3.
37. Companion document, 3.
38. SEC 385(2010), 9.
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which in turn cites a 2009 YouGovPsychonomics study commissioned by the
EC (“YouGov Study”),39 which found that 61 percent of attempts at online,
cross-border purchases failed, and that 50 out of that 61 percent failed because
the seller refused to sell to the consumer’s country.40
If this statistic is representative of the actual experiences of consumers, then
there is indeed a serious problem with online B2C contracts in the European
Union. And perhaps it is differences in contract law that lead to half of all
online, cross-border purchase attempts being rejected because the seller
refuses to sell to the buyer’s country. If so, there may be a real need to address
B2C contracts at the European level. Still, this statistic is surprising; is it
possible that in practice more than half of online purchase attempts are
rejected by the seller?
A closer look at the data tells a less dramatic story. First, the YouGov Study
points out that in 52 percent of all attempts at online, cross-border purchases
the seller did not provide for shipping outside of the seller’s home country.41
Thus, the entire result – that half of all online, cross-border purchase attempts
are rejected because the seller does not serve the buyer’s country – is
explained by the fact that half of all online retailers do not ship
internationally.42
Second, the YouGov Study, by design, did not target online retailers that
purport to serve more than one country; instead the goal of that study was to
target any retailer that had any online presence at all. In this respect the study
was successful: the study identified nearly 17,000 offers on 100 different
consumer products from over 4,000 online retailers.43 Thus, if consumers
randomly selected retailers with an online presence and attempted to make
purchases, they would fail more than half the time – this is what the YouGov
Study meticulously shows. It is not true, however, that in practice consumers
cannot make purchases half the time. Instead, both the Flash EB 299 data and
39. “Mystery shopping evaluation of cross-border e-commerce in the EU”,
YouGovPsychonomics (2009)), cited in Scoreboard, SEC 385(2010), 27 n. 12.
40. YouGov Study, 24.
41. Ibid., 28.
42. This does not mean that contract law is not the problem: it could be that sellers are
reluctant to ship cross-border because of concerns about contract law. Indeed, in the internet
context, one might wonder what difference in costs to the seller, other than contract law, would
deter a seller from trading cross-border; shipping costs may not differ much and may be borne
by the purchaser anyway. But the fact that half of all sellers do not ship internationally could
simply reflect the fact that many retailers target a more local audience, and are not interested in
competing with larger, more internationally focused internet retailers. The data do not refute the
hypothesis that contract law is causing the problems identified by the YouGov Study, but the
data do not prove it, either.
43. YouGov Study, 19. The majority of retailers identified made offers on only one of the
100 products searched for.
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the Scoreboard data show that no more than 8 percent of consumers who shop
online in a 12 month period are unable to complete an online, cross-border
purchase at least once during that period.44
3.2.

Do consumers perceive contract-law-related barriers to online
shopping?

The relatively low rate with which consumers experience problems with
online, cross-border shopping suggests that differences in contract law may
not be quite as large a problem as the Companion Document implies. Indeed,
the Scoreboard data suggest that consumers do not perceive serious problems
with contract law when shopping online. When consumers who make
purchases online were asked why they shopped online, 49 percent said that
“certainty about legal rights” was a “very important” reason, just behind
“lower prices” (50 percent).45 See Table 7. This bears repeating: about half of
all consumers who shop online say they do so because it offers certainty about
legal rights.
Table 7: Percent of Online Consumers Describing Reason for Shopping
Online as “Very Important”
Reason

Very
Important

Lower prices
Certainty about legal rights and guarantee
Convenience
User-friendliness of the website
Unavailability of the good in the area or region
Wider choice of goods and services
Certified quality of the website or availability of
recognized trust mark
Ratings and feedbacks on the website from other users

50
49
48
45
45
39
35
31

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 because of rounding.
Source: Scoreboard, 24.
44. According to Flash EB 299a, of EU consumers who had engaged in distance purchases
in the last 12 months, 8 % encountered at least once a seller who had refused to sell or deliver
to them. Analytical Report, Flash EB 299a, 9. According to Scoreboard, 11 % of online
shoppers reported a problem when buying or ordering goods, and most of these consumers
reported problems other than a refusal to sell, such as delivery delays or technical failures with
the website. Scoreboard, 24–25.
45. When including both “very important” and “to some extent” responses, “certainty about
legal rights” comes in first among the eight reasons offered. Scoreboard, 24.
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On the other hand, when consumers who had not shopped online were asked
why they did not, the most common reasons given were “Prefer to shop in
person” (20 percent) and “Have no need” (17 percent). The top-ranking reason
that seems related to contract law, “trust concerns/receiving or returning
goods, complaints or redress” (9 percent) came in a distant fifth place.46
One limitation of this data is that these questions do not distinguish between
domestic and cross-border online purchases. This is a weakness of the cited
Flash EB surveys as well. In general, they do not ask companies or consumers
to compare their experiences in domestic trade with their experiences in
cross-border trade. As a consequence, it is hard to tell whether these statistics
apply equally to domestic and cross-border online shopping.
Fortunately, there was at least one question in the Flash EB 299 survey that
made such a direct comparison. In this question consumers who had made at
least one distance purchase – i.e. by internet, post, or phone – in the last 12
months whether they had experienced any problems with the delivery of the
goods they had ordered. As Table 8 shows, consumers reported no more
delivery problems with cross-border purchases from other Member States
than from their home countries. (Indeed they reported slightly fewer). This
result suggests that cross-border transactions may involve fewer problems
than we might otherwise assume.
Table 8: Percent of Consumers Who Experienced Delay or Non-Delivery of
Distance Purchases, by Seller Location

Consumer’s Own Country
Another Member State
Non-EU Country

Delay in
Delivery

No Delivery at
All

18
16
19

6
5
6

Source: Summary, Flash EB 299, 20.

3.3.

Is there a need for higher, uniform consumer protection?

One theme that runs throughout the European Commission’s activities in the
area of contract law is a strong commitment to consumer protection, often
through the use of mandatory rules. CESL is no exception. It provides “a
single set of mandatory rules which offer a high level of consumer
protection”.47
46. Scoreboard, 25.
47. Proposal, 4.
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To the extent that this replicates the degree of consumer protection already
present in the law of most EU nations, this approach seems to jibe with the
attitudes of most European consumers. The recent Flash EB survey of
consumers indicates that consumers are largely satisfied with existing
consumer protections. See Table 9. By a 2-to-1 margin, consumers agreed
with the statement that sellers in their countries respected their rights.48 (The
survey did not ask about sellers in other Member States).
Table 9: Consumer Attitudes Toward Existing Consumer Protections
Agree/Tend to Disagree/Tend to
Agree
Disagree
You are adequately protected
by existing measures to protect
consumers
In general, sellers in your country
respect your rights as a consumer

57

35

65

28

Note: Percentages responding “Don’t Know/NA” are omitted.
Source: Summary, Flash EB 299, 23.

To the extent that CESL serves to increase, rather than preserve, the level of
mandatory consumer protection, its merits are less clear. Because CESL is an
optional instrument, it may offer advantages for those consumers who desire
greater protections than currently available to them. On the other hand,
mandatory consumer protections do not come for free. They raise the costs of
sellers, and therefore raise the prices that all consumers must pay. Further,
Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar argue that mandatory consumer protections will
subsidize sophisticated consumers, who know to invoke them, at the expense
of the “poor, the elderly, the less educated”.49
Here, the Flash EB surveys make a final contribution. The consumer
attitudes survey examined which consumers were the most likely to identify a
problem with their purchase and complain to the seller about it. And it finds
that, as Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar predict, the elderly and least educated are far
less likely to invoke their rights by complaining to a seller than the younger
and more educated. See Figure 2. The concern that the most vulnerable groups
will be cross-subsidizing the most advantaged may not be speculative.
48. Interestingly, trust in sellers to respect consumer’s rights was higher than trust in public
authorities to protect the consumer’s rights. Summary, Flash EB 299, 23.
49. Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, “Regulatory techniques in consumer protection: A critique of
the Common European Sales Law”, section 2.2.
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Figure 2: Percentage of Consumers Identifying a Problem and
Complaining to the Seller, by Education and Age

Note:“Least Educated” left school before age 16;“Most educated” continued school past age 20.
Source:Analytical Report, Flash EB 299, 132.

4.

Conclusion

The Proposal and its Companion Document cite a number of surveys in
support of their central empirical claims: that there are SMEs and consumers
who want engage in cross-border transactions or increase their cross-border
activity, but do not, and that obstacles created by differences in contract law
are impediments to cross-border trade, especially for SMEs and consumers. A
closer look at these surveys, especially the Flash Eurobarometer surveys on
which the Proposal primary relies, reveals that the cited data only
ambiguously supports these empirical claims. The cited surveys tend to cast
doubt that the numbers of discouraged traders are large, and the surveys make
a weak case that contract law is the primary obstacle to cross-border trade.
Nonetheless, it is plausible that contract law plays a role in discouraging a
small but economically significant number of traders and consumers from
cross-border trade.
Given the controversy surrounding CESL and the numerous concerns about
the precise ways in which it implements its vision of a uniform European sales
law, it is worth further study to determine whether the empirical claims
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justifying this project can be validated. Studies other than the surveys cited by
the Proposal may help to support or refute the empirical claims in the
Proposal. A better sense of the empirical foundations of the Proposal will
inform the normative and policy-based arguments – many of which are
articulated by other papers in this special issue – that will ultimately determine
the fate of CESL.

